Low-Cost Quick-Look Radiation Testing of Electronic Components for the Mars Observer Camera by Brylow, S.M. & Soulanille, T.A.
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
LOW-COST QUICK-LOOK RADIATION TESTING OF 
ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS FOR THE MARS OBSERVER CAMERA 
S. M. Brylow and T. A. Soulanille* 
Altadena Instruments Corporation 
Pasadena, California 91105 
Abstract 
The development of modern electronics has far out-
stripped the inventory of components for which 
radiation tolerance has been determined and pub-
lished. New component characteristics require a 
more integrated approach to radiation tolerance in 
system design. The Mars Observer Camera perfor-
mance requirements could not be met with a design 
restricted to components of established radiation 
hardness. A balanced approach that intimately in-
volved radiation effects in the system design process 
was required. This included low-cost, quick 
turnaround testing of total ionizing dose and heavy 
ion induced single event phenomena of upset and 
latchup. The results were used to inform the system 
design, which had to adapt to real component sus-
ceptibilities. Test results directly affected component 
selection, radiation shielding, and the data path and 
software architectures. 
1. Introduction 
Radiation resistance of electronic components is a 
significant factor in system design for a variety of 
earth-orbiting and interplanetary missions. To il-
lustrate how radiation concerns interact with system 
design, this paper discusses radiation tolerance is-
sues in the design of the Mars Observer Camera 
(MOC). 
The NASA Mars Observer mission, managed by the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and planned for a 
late September 1992 launch, involves a year of inter-
planetary cruise followed by one Mars year (two 
Earth years) of mapping orbits. Dr. Michael Malin 
is the Principal Investigator for the MOC, the camera 
on Mars Observer. Caltech was responsible for de-
signing and delivering the instrument; Altadena 
Instruments provided systems and detailed engi-
neering for that effort. 
The principal science objectives of the MOC investi-
gation require targeted meter-scale resolution im-
ages of kilometer-scale scenes, and global coverage 
of Mars at kilometer-scale resolution in red and blue 
colors on week time scales. The MOC high resolu-
tion imager uses a CCD line array of 2048 photo-
sensitive elements in a pushbroom configuration at 
the focal plane of a 35 cm aperture reflecting tele-
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scope. Its 0.42° field of view covers 3 km at 1.5 meters 
per pixel from a 380 km polar sun-synchronous orbit. 
Two wide field (140°) imaging systems use similar 
CCD's with 3456 photosites to cover Mars limb-to-
limb in red and blue bands at 250 meters per pixel at 
the nadir. (The MOC investigation is described in1 
and the instrument development in2.) 
2. System Requirements 
The MOC is nadir-fixed on the spacecraft. The 
ground-track speed, the required resolution and 
number of pixels in the cross-track dimension to im-
pose a pixel rate of 5 Megapixels per second. This ex-
ceeds the spacecraft data system bandwidth by 103, 
requiring an image buffer in the MOC. It further re-
quires an analog signal chain of high video band-
width. 
The absence of pointing control limits opportunities 
to image a particular target to a few per mission, re-
quiring that the MOC be able to acquire and store 
multiple images. Images from the telescope are 
nominally 2k x 2k pixels quantized to 8 bits, so a raw 
image requires 4M bytes. The image buffer was re-
quired to provide three times this capacity, or 12M 
bytes. 
Image compression was required to make effective 
use of the limited downlink capability of Mars 
Observer, as well as to extend the capacity of the im-
age buffer. The substantial pixel-level redundancy 
in real images allows scientific interpretation of 
images with bad pixels; compressing out that redun-
dancy results in data that is intolerant of errors. 
Requirements on bit error rates are therefore more 
relaxed for raw data than compressed data. 
The MOC is required to operate autonomously for 
days from stored commands, and to provide exten-
sive data editing, variable resolution, and variable 
image compression capabilities by command. A ca-
pable microprocessor control and data processing 
system was imperative. 
a. Resources & Constraints 
Power, mass and volume contraints were commen-
surate with intermediate-scale planetary spacecraft. 
The MOC was initially limited to 9 kg (much of 
which was required by the telescope) and 7 watts av-
erage. The anticipated Total Dose (TD) of ionizing 
radiation behind various shielding densities was 
provided by JPL. It was aproximately 10 krad behind 
0.4 g/cm2 of aluminum. JPL also provided integral 
flux (Heinrich curve) estimates fQr the heavy ions 
that cause Single Event Upset (SEU) and Single 
Event Latchup (SEL) in susceptible components. 
4. Component Reauirements 
The MOC required what were high-performance 
components in 1986 to meet its performance re-
quirements within the system constraints. An op-
amp of order 60 MHz bandwidth and 10 ns rise time 
for 100 mW, and a 5M sample per second 8-bit AID 
for < 250 m W were needed for the analog signal 
chain. The image buffer needed a 150 ns 1 Megabit 
RAM for < 20 mW quiescent. Instrument control 
and data processing required a > 0.5 MIPS 32-bit mi-
croprocessor and over lOOk bytes of RAM and ROM. 
Digital Application Specific Integrated Circuits 
(ASICs) clocked at 20 MHz were required to provide 
control and data paths to tie the system together. 
Most of these were not available as proven radiation-
resistant components in 1986. For example, a 4 kbit 
space-qualified SRAM was available3 and a 16 kbit 
component was under development. An impractical 
4,000 of these latter components would have been re-
quired to implement the minimum image buffer. 
We were forced outside the confines of the Preferred 
Parts Lists. 
5. System Approach to Rad Resistance 
The realities of using ordinary military and com-
mercial components in space required a system ap-
proach to radiation resistance. The decision was 
made early in the program that it was not effective to 
demand all system level radiation performance 
requirements be met at the component level. The se-
lected approach was to design a radiation tolerant 
system rather than simply design a system and pop-
ulate it with radiation hard components. This does 
not eliminate the need to find and utilize radiation 
tolerant components but it does allow the designer 
more flexibility in designing for a potentially dam-
aging radiation environment. For example, rather 
than require an absolutely radiation resistant RAM 
with which to construct the image buffer, Altadena 
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Instruments sought a radiation resistant buffer de-
sign that could be built using real components. 
The shielding provided by the telescope and electrQn-
ics enclosure was calculated for different locations 
within the electronics package and affected parts 
placement. Spot shielding of individual components 
was an option to reduce mission TD to < 5 krads 
where needed. 
Heavy ions of solar or galactic origin can produce 
enough ionization per unit length of travel (Linear 
Energy Transfer, or LET) to disturb a small-geome-
try IC with the passage of a single ion. A transient or 
persistent logic state change can result, referred to as 
a Single Event Upset (SEU). If a PNPN structure ex-
ists between the power rails, as is incidental to many 
CMOS processes, the deposited charge can turn on 
this parasitic SCR if certain conditions are met. 
This effect is termed Single Event Latchup (SEL). 
The metric for the significance of SEU in various 
components was its effect on science data return. 
Pixel error rates of 10-3 are quite acceptable, so the 
analog processing chain could be allowed occasional 
transients, and raw pixel data could be stored in 
SEU-sensitive memory. An error in compressed im-
age data could scramble a quarter million pixels, so 
some measure was required to protect those data. 
Likewise, damage to stored instrument commands 
could cause the loss of multiple images. 
An upset in logic circuitry in the controVdata path 
could damage an image acquisition. An upset in the 
'CPU or the stack would cause unpredictable errors, 
possibly damaging data or causing a program 
crash. A bit flip in the program execution store is 
more serious still, requiring a program reload from 
on-board ROM or from the ground in the worst case. 
Component SEU and system error detection and re-
covery requirements had to be balanced in response 
to these considerations. 
Latchup 
The effects of latchups were similarly considered, 
with the additional problem that an uncontrolled 
component latchup might crash the power supply or 
destroy the part by overheating, Some components 
are intrinically immune to SEL by design, e.g. sin-
gle transistors and CMOS silicon on insulator IC's 
do not contain 4-layer PNPN structures. Others have 
demonstrated SEU/SEL immunity. CMOS on suffi-
ciently thin epitaxial layers with sufficient substrate 
conductivity can be latchup immune. CD4000 series 
CMOS logic, with its huge feature size, is available 
SEU/SEL immune. 
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Since latchup of incidental PNPN structures re-
quires a certain sustaining current, if that current is 
sufficiently higher than the operating . current the 
component can be prevented from latching up by 
series resistors in .the power leads. Where the only 
parts that can do the job are latchup susceptible it is 
necessary to sense and clear latchups by power cy-
cling the component, a technique rarely used in 
19864. 
6. Testin« Prouam 
Candidate components that met the other system cri-
teria of performance, power consumption, package 
suitability and anticipated reliability were tested for 
radiation resistance. These included op-amps, ana-
log switches, a voltage to frequency converter, 8-bit 
flash AID converters, several static and dynamic 
RAM, UVEPROM, and a microprocessor. 
Total Dose 
Total dose testing was performed by exposing com-
ponents to 1.17 and 1.33 MeV photons from 60Co de-
cay, at Sandia National Laboratory's Gamma 
Irradiation Facility and in a 60Co cell at UCLA. 
Dose rates ranged from 150 rads per minute up to 2500 
rads per minute at the upper doseages, necessarily 
far exceeding those expected during the three-year 
mission. 
In testing digital components, ten samples of each 
part were typically used, with eight being irradiated 
and two kept as controls. During irradiation three 
devices were powered with inputs biased high, three 
powered with inputs biased low, and two unpowered. 
No measurements were made while the devices un-
der test were being irradiated. 
Component testing outside the radiation cell was al-
ternated with irradiation inside, with time outside 
limited to less than 1 hour per cycle. Irradiation pro-
ceeded in increasing incremental doses until all 
components failed or functionality to 100 krad had 
been demonstrated. 
Some of the analog components were tested in-situ in 
this fashion. Some late tests were conducted by irra-
diating samples and testing them on the bench a few 
days later. In this case samples of 12 devices were 
typically used, with two unirradiated controls and 
two of each device type removed from exposure at 
each of five radiation levels. 
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Fixturin~ 
Test fixturing for the memories was implemented on 
a plug-in card in an IBM PC type computer. Access 
times could be varied and the devices read and writ-
ten under program control. Memory bit integrity 
tests were implemented in software, and results were 
recorded to floppy disk. DRAM refresh times were 
measured and found to correlate with dosage5 . 
Device IDD was measured and logged. 
Candidate AID's were tested in another plug-in 
card. A 4k x 10 bit RAM was read out into a 10-bit 
video D/A converter whose output was buffered into 
the devices under test. That system was operated at 
the 200ns per sample required of the AID in the MOC, 
and the converter output captured by another RAM. 
The stimulus RAM was written and the response 
RAM read by the PC. A slow ramp was used to test DC 
linearity, with sawtooth and step stimuli to deter-
mine dynamic performance. 
The microprocessor was tested in a small stand-
alone system that had an RS-232 serial connection to 
the test PC. The clock speed was switch-selectable. 
An EPROM in the test system contained a test pro-
gram that announced its results via the serial port. 
Op-amps were irradiated in amplifier configura-
tions that served as test fixtures for input bias. 
Amplified bias was measured by digital voltmeter. 
Irradiated components were tested later on the bench 
for video characteristics. The voltage to frequency 
converter was tested in a fixture that operated it at a 
reference voltage. Output was measured with a fre-
quency counter. 
Results 
Results of digital component testing are summa-
rized in Table 1. We had the good fortune of discov-
ering a high-capacity (in 1986) DRAM that provided 
a significant margin in total dose resistance over 
the expected environment. 
Table 1 - Total Dose Testing of Digital Devices 
~ ~ MlUll!f Parameter Function 12! 
MM884256-15 DRAM Fujitsu bit faults 6 krad 
D43256C-lOL DRAM NEe bit faults 15 krad 
TC55257PL-1O DRAM Toshiba bit faults 6 krad 
M411024PP·15 DRAM ATT bit faults >80 krad 
M41256HPM-15B DRAM ATT bit faults >61 krad 
TC511000P-1O DRAM Toshiba bit faults 15 krad 
SMJ27C256-15 EPROM 11 bit faults 6 krad 
*For purposes of this table, functional is the level up to which no 
memory errors were seen. Performance may have been acceptable 
to higher levels, but this is the earliest point at which data was 
lost. 
The EPROM tested showed some bit errors at a dose 
approximately equal to the expected mission dose, but 
recovered ("annealed") in the subsequent weeks. We 
nevertheless made system adaptations described be-
low. 
Table 2 shows the results of total dose testing of ana-
log devices. 
Table 2 - Total Dose Testing of Analog Devices 
~ Inm .MlmDf Parameter Function 12! 
SD2IS DFET Topaz Vp 40 krad 
CDG308 Ana. Sw. Topaz Ron. Va. Vd 40 krad 
HAS141 Op-amp Hanis VO&.Ib 25 krad 
HA5147 Op-amp Hanis V 05' Ib 40 krad 
HA5152 Op-amp Hanis VO&.Ib 25 krad 
EL2020 Op-amp Elantec Vos> Ib 100 krad 
LM 131 Va> NatSemi fout 40 krad 
CA3318 NO RCA linearity 6 krad 
*For purposes of this table, functional is the level up to which the 
measured parameters remained within their maximum allowable 
data sheet values. Performance in a particular application may 
have been acceptable to higher levels. 
SEUISEL 
Testing for SEU and SEL requires a different ap-
proach. The radiation effect is not cumulative with 
exposure, since the issue is the susceptibility of com-
ponents to single ionizing events, which is a func-
tion of the amount of charge deposited in the sensitive 
region of the device. It is necessary to test with a 
range of ionization densities, or LET's. The device 
under test must be operated during exposure, and 
must be under vacuum with the die exposed in order 
to use laboratory sources of suitable ions. 
Device susceptibility to SEU or SEL is described in 
terms of an effective cross-section for the effect as a 
function of LET. The expected event rate for that 
component in a particular environment is calcu-
lated by integrating the product of expected flux and 
measured cross-section across the LET spectrum. A 
given device will have a threshold LET below which 
there is no effect, and typically for simple devices 
such as memories, a saturation LET above which the 
cross-section does not increase. At the higher LET 
end of the spectrum the flux in space drops off expo-
nentially, so the integration can be performed over a 
finite range of LET. The testing problem then is to 
find the LET threshold and measure the cross-sec-
tion from that LET up to saturation. For devices 
which do not show SEU or SEL in testing the problem 
is to establish by exposure to a sufficient fluence of a 
sufficiently high LET that the probability of upset or 
latchup in the expected environment can be consid-
ered zero for engineering purposes. 
4 
Sources 
Traditional single event testing employs large ac-
celerators such as the cyclotrons at Berkeley or 
Brookhaven. They provide good control of LET and 
flux over a range of LET from 0.002 MeV I (mglcm2) 
to beyond 40 MeV I (mglcm2). Unfortunately, time 
on these machines must be scheduled months in ad-
vance and costs tens of thousands of dollars a day6. 
We were constrained by schedule and budget to us-
ing other. sources. 
We used three sources of ions for single event test-
ing. Americium provided the low end of our scale; 
Am241 decays with half-life 458y by emission of 
5.5MeV (X particles of LET = 0.6 MeV I (mglcm2). 
Californium provided the high end; C~52 decays 
with half-life 2.65y, 97% by (X emission and 3% by 
spontaneous fission producing fragments of LET 
clustered about 43 MeV I (mglcm2)7. 
The Caltech tandem Van de Graaf accelerator was 
operated to provide ions in the range of 0.7 to 7 MeV I 
(mg/cm2 ). This left the range from 7 to 42 MeV I 
(mg/cm2) unmeasured, requiring that we make the 
worst-case assumption that the cross-section ob-
served at 42 MeV I (mglcm2) was the cross-section 
for all LET above 7 MeV I (mglcm2). 
Fixturing 
The stand-alone microprocessor system used in total 
dose testing was adapted for operation in vacuum to 
provide a fixture for processor and memory single 
event testing. The lid was pried off the package of the 
device under test, and the die was exposed to the ion 
source in a vacuum chamber. Software provided a 
continuous memory test that reported and cleared 
upsets at each pass through the memory, allowing 
rapid testing (> 500 upsets per second) at high ion 
fluxes. A microprocessor test program was used 
when the processor was in the beam, which tested not 
only the normal registers but instruction decode, the 
ALU data path, and whatever else could send the pro-
cessor execution awry. A deadman timer provided a 
reset when the program got lost. Results were re-
ported via the serial port, across a vacuum feedthru 
and into a test PC for logging. 
Since latchup was an issue during exposure as well, 
SEL testing was conducted simultaneously. A 
latchup during SEU testing would otherwise seri-
ously confuse the upset measurement process. The 
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power supply for the device under test was instru-
mented to provide a voltage proportional to the cur-
rent being drawn. This voltage was measured by an 
AID converter card within the test PC. Test software 
provided an adjustable current threshold for latchup 
detection. When the threshold was exceeded th~ de-
vice was allowed to dwell in that condition for a 
fraction of a second to provide measurement of the 
current drawn in the latched condition, a quantity 
needed for the design of the flight latchup detection 
circuitry. Software then commanded the power sup-
ply off and back on to clear the latchup, and logged 
the event. 
Results 
The measured cross-sections for upset and latchup 
were multiplied by the expected environment, under 
the pessimistic assumption that the cross-section in 
the LET range between two measurements was equal' 
to the higher measurement (always at the higher 
LET). The integral of this product as a function of 
LET gave expected mean rates for SEU and SEL for 
the mission, shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 - Single Event Testing of Devices 
I&m 
SMJ27C256-15 
NS32C016 
UTD212R 
M411024PP-15 
HC6264B 
MiImf 
11 
NatSemi 
UlMC 
AT&T 
Honeywell 
SEUatMars 
1.7 x 10-4 
4.3xlO- 1 
3.0xlO-6 
8.4x101 
3.0xlO-6 
7. Desitm 
SELatMars 
1.7 x 10-4 
4.8xlO- 1 
3.0xlO-6 
2.9xlO-4 
3.0xlO-6 
The system design grew from the ends toward the 
middle, top down from architecture and bottom up 
from component capabilities and susceptibilities. In 
accord with the philosophy of not requiring the com-
ponents to meet all of the system-level radiation re-
quirements, designs were studied which would allow 
tolerance of radiation effects. 
The AT&T 1M bit DRAM was selected for the 12M 
byte data buffer, providing a design margin for total 
dose greater than a factor of five. The SEU and SEL 
susceptibilities presented design problems. The ex-
pected SEU-induced bit error rate of 8x10-5 per day 
was acceptable for uncompressed images, but some 
form of error correction was required for compressed 
data. A block Error Correction Code (ECC) was se-
lected that corrects two bad bits in 256 for an overhead 
of 16 bits. Flight software writes and reads blocks of 
error-sensitive data through routines which apply the 
ECC and use it to correct errors. We adopted a re-
quirement to provide compression of the 5M pixel per 
second data stream between the AID converter and 
the data buffer, producing error-sensitive data much 
faster than software could apply the ECC to it. 
Consequently the pixel data path hardware was re-
quired to calculate the ECC. 
The expected mean SEL rate of 1 latchup in the 96 
DRAMs every 36 days required latchup sense and 
recovery. The data path architecture produced two 
buffers of 3M words 16 bits wide. The current draw of 
the M411024 in the latched state is only of order five 
times operating current when being accessed, so 16 
current sensors were employed per buffer, one for 
each bit position. Any of these can trigger a power cy-
cle. A mosfet switch in the VDD line that supplies the 
48 devices in a buffer, normally saturated on, is cy-
cled off for aproximately 2 ms to clear the latchup. 
During that time it is necessary to gate low all logic 
connections to the unpowered DRAM's to keep from 
holding up the power rail through their input protec-
tion diodes. Since the bits are stored as charges on 
capacitors rather than currents through transistors 
as in SRAM, data in the DRAM is retained through 
the SEL-clearing power cycle. 
The microprocessor system presented a different 
problem. Sandia National Laboratories completed 
development of the SA3300, a "war-protected" ver-
sion of the National Semiconductor NS32C016 that we 
had tested, in time for us to incorporate it in the de-
sign. According to their testing this part would have 
a mean upset interval longer than the mission dura-
tion, as well as providing a total dose margin of a 
factor of more than ten. In this era Honeywell devel-
oped a 16k x 8 CMOS SRAM with similar hardness, 
providing a place for the opcode store, processor stack 
and working variables. 
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For efficiency in testing, and to avoid having to 
upload what turned out to be 256k bytes of program 
and data tables during flight, non-volatile memory 
to retain the program was required. The flight soft-
ware development schedule did not allow the use of 
mask-programmed ROM, so the tested EPROM was 
used. Despite the observed post-irradiation anneal-
ing, we elected to provide spot shielding to lower the 
expected dose to half the dose at which bit errrors were 
first observed. We further decided that this device 
was not suitable to respond to opcode fetches, and 
adapted the system architecture as follows. 
When power is applied to the MOC, the system is 
cold-reset and the processor starts execution at its 
standard startup address. Its address and data 
busses connect only to an ASIC, the Control Gate 
Array (CGA). The CGA services read requests in the 
startup address range by reading from three separate 
EPROMs and triplicate-voting the result to arrive at 
the value provided to the processor. The bootstrap 
routine executes in this way. The body of the flight 
software is stored in the EPROM with the same ECC 
as used in the DRAM buffer. It is read out and errors 
are corrected by the bootstrap program, and stored in 
hard SRAM, to which execution is transferred when 
it is in place. 
Power considerations left no choice but to use the 
CA3318 CMOS SOS flash AID, despite its susceptibil-
ity to total dose. It was placed near the center of the 
board to receive maximum shielding from the 3.5kg 
primary mirror directly above it, and surrounded 
the package with as much spot shielding as we could 
fit. The expected total dose to this component was 
thereby limited to 3kRad, a factor of one-half of the 
dose where degradation was observed. 
Latchup in analog components was addressed by 
multiple means. The analog switches had a low 
enough operating current that series resistors in the 
power leads could be used to keep the device below its 
latchup sustain current. To provide overall protec-
tion of the analog power rails, overcurrent power cy-
cling was integrated with low-headroom dual track-
ing linear "skimmer" FET post-regulators, inci-
dently providing 20 dB rejection of the power supply 
switching frequency, and logic-level on-off control 
of the circuit block. The turn-on dV/dT was limited 
to 250 VIs to keep well below the rate where charging 
the bypass capacitors would trigger an overcurrent 
cycle. 
8. Summary 
Modern space systems in constrained resource envi-
ronments can benefit from an integrated system-
level approach to radiation resistance. This re-
quires determining the radiation susceptibility of 
candidate components. Radiation susceptibility can 
be determined to a level sufficient to interact with the 
system design process in a rapid and comparatively 
inexpensive fashion. Altadena Instruments' devel-
opment of the Mars Observer Camera has demon-
strated this approach in a NASA planetary space 
mission context. 
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